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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred Under Rule 11 When It Corrected Villavicencio's Illegal
Sentence In A Way That Vitiated The Parties' Binding Plea Agreement

A

Introduction
In September 2005, to resolve three separate criminal cases, Villavicencio

entered into a global binding Rule 11 plea agreement with the state. (See R., pp.4445.)

The parties agreed that (1) Villavicencio would plead guilty to two counts of

possession of a controlled substance and violating a no contact order; (2) the state
would dismiss the remaining counts and cases against Villavicencio; (3) Villavicencio
would receive consecutive sentences on each felony count of five years with one and a
half years fixed, for a total sentence of ten years; (4) the district court would retain
jurisdiction for 180 days; and (5) upon successful completion of the period of retained
jurisdiction, Villavicencio would be placed on probation for a period of ten years. (Id.)
The district court accepted the parties' agreement and so bound itself to the plea
agreement. (R., p.48.)
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court introduced a factual
mistake into the proceedings when it misremembered that Villavicencio's underlying
sentences had been concurrent, rather than consecutive. (Compare 3/6/2006 Tr., p.7,
Ls.4-10 with R., pp.42, 45.) It therefore incorrectly placed Villavicencio on concurrent
periods of probation, each for ten years, in its effort to comply with the parties' binding
plea agreement, assuming that any error would be invited and so unchallengeable. (R.,
pp.97-103; 3/6/2006 Tr., p.7, L.4 - p.9, L.2.) When Villavicencio violated his probations
seven and a half years later, he filed a Rule 35 motion to correct his sentence. (R.,
pp.208-10.)

The district court (with a new judge presiding) determined that the
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sentence was illegal and, rather than correct the sentence to reflect the parties' binding
plea agreement, entered an order reducing Villavicencio's term of probation on all
counts to seven years. (R., pp.256-59.)
The state appealed from the district court's order, arguing that it erred by
"correcting" Villavicencio's sentence in a way that in fact vitiated the parties' binding
plea agreement.

(Appellant's brief, pp.4-9.)

The court should have corrected the

sentence, not negated the plea agreement. In response, Villavicencio argues that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to correct Villavicencio's sentence in a way
that would comply with the binding plea agreement.

(Respondent's brief, pp.6-14.)

Villavicencio's argument fails. Jurisdiction is conferred by operation of statute or rule;
Rule 35, by authorizing a court to correct an illegal sentence, allows the court the
necessary jurisdiction to, in fact, correct the sentence. The district court's order should
be vacated and this case remanded for resentencing consistent with the parties' binding
Rule 11 plea agreement.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law to be

reviewed by the Court de nova, in accordance with contract law standards." State v.
Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005) (citation omitted).

C.

The District Court Has Sufficient Jurisdiction To Correct Villavicencio's Sentence
In A Way That Implements The Parties' Plea Agreement
A plea agreement is contractual in nature and must be measured by contract law

standards. State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 376, 233 P.3d 750, 759 (2010). When the
court accepts the parties' binding plea agreement under Rule 11, the court is required to
2

"implement the disposition provided for in the plea agreement." I.C.R. 11 (f)(3). In its
opening brief, the state conceded that Villavicencio should not have been placed on
"concurrent probations" for a period of ten years; that sentence was based on a mistake
of fact, was illegal, and needed to be corrected.

(See Appellant's brief, pp.4, 6-7.)

However, the condition that Villavicencio serve ten years of probation was not itself
illegal and could have been accomplished through legal means.

(Id.) Because that

condition was part of the binding Rule 11 plea agreement, the district court was required
to correct Villavicencio's sentence in a way that implemented that term. Because the
district court instead vitiated that condition and rendered the agreement inoperable, the
district court erred and should be reversed.
On appeal, Villavicencio contends that the district court lost jurisdiction over his
case and therefore lacks legal authority to correctly structure his sentence consistent
with the parties' binding plea agreement.

(Respondent's brief, pp.6-11.)

Seeking

support for this argument, Villavicencio relies on State v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673, 315
P.3d 861 (Ct. App. 2013).

In Kesling, the Court held that statutes which extend a

court's jurisdiction for purposes of probation do not extend that jurisdiction beyond the
maximum term of probation.

~

at 677, 315 P.3d 865.

Kesling is not dispositive for two reasons. First, while the state recognizes that
probation cannot exceed "the maximum period for which the defendant may be
imprisoned," I.C. §§ 19-2601 (7), 20-222, multiple terms of probation can lawfully be run
consecutively.

State v. Horejs, 143 Idaho 260,266,141 P.3d 1129, 1135 (Ct. App.

2006). Villavicencio was convicted of two counts of possession of methamphetamine
and a violation of a no contact order. The maximum period of probation which could be
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ordered for these crimes is not seven years, as Villavicencio claims on appeal.
Respondent's brief, p.8.)

(See

Rather, it is 16 years-seven years for the possession of

methamphetamine in Case No. CR-2005-2654, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1); seven years for the
possession of methamphetamine in Case No. CR-2004-2777, id.; and two years for
violating a no contact order in the latter case, I.C. § 19-2601(7). Because it is lawful to
run all of these probations consecutively, the court was well within the maximum term of
probation available and may appropriately restructure Villavicencio's sentence to reflect
and implement the parties' binding plea agreement.
Second, though Villavicencio asserts that his case is "virtually indistinguishable"
from Kesling (Appellant's brief, p.10), he overlooks one major distinction:

Unlike in

Kesling, Villavicencio's sentence was arrived at through a binding Rule 11 plea
agreement.

The provision that Villavicencio serve a ten year term of probation,

especially within the framework of that agreement which provided for consecutive
underlying sentences of five years each, is legal. Because it is legal and was accepted
by the court, it is mandatory for the court to implement the provision. I.C.R. 11 (f)(3).
And, where provisions are mandatory, a court is even authorized under Rule 35 to
increase a sentence if necessary to correct it. State v. Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577, 582,
288 P.3d 132, 137 (Ct. App. 2012).
Villavicencio also asserts, contrary to precedent, that he is entitled to benefit from
his plea agreement while depriving the state of its reciprocal benefits. (Respondent's
brief, p.11.) To support this proposition, Villavicencio relies on State v. Armstrong, 146
Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct. App. 2008).

Villavicencio's reliance is misplaced.

In

Armstrong, the defendant entered into an initial plea agreement with the state in which
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the state agreed not to request a psychosexual evaluation prior to sentencing.
373, 195 P.3d at 732.

kl

at

Later, Armstrong's probation officer requested Armstrong to

submit to a psychosexual evaluation.

kl

When he refused, the probation officer

kl

brought a probation violation allegation against him.

Armstrong claimed that

requiring him to participate in the psychosexual evaluation violated his plea agreement
and asserted that he should be allowed to withdraw the plea agreement.

kl

The

district court determined that the state had not violated the plea agreement, but "in
fairness," still permitted Armstrong to withdraw.

kl

The parties entered a second plea agreement.

kl

Following a period of retained

jurisdiction, the court ordered a term of probation that exceeded the term agreed to in
the second plea agreement and Armstrong appealed.

kL.

The Court, however, found

that the district court lacked jurisdiction to allow Armstrong to withdraw his guilty plea in
the first place because Idaho Criminal Rule 33 does not include any provision extending
the jurisdiction of the district court.

kl

at 377-78, 195 P.3d at 736-37.

The Court

therefore vacated the second order placing Armstrong on probation and enforced the
parties' initial plea agreement.

~

at 378, 195 P.3d at 737.

The Court's holding in Armstrong does not appear relevant to this case. Unlike
Rule 33, Idaho Criminal Rule 35 does extend the court's jurisdiction to "correct a
sentence that is illegal from the face of the record at any time." I.C.R. 35(a) (emphasis
added); see also State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355 n.5, 79 P.3d 711, 714 n.5 (2003)
(recognizing that Rule 35 extends a court's jurisdiction to permit a motion to correct an
illegal sentence at any time). Because Rule 35 extends the court's jurisdiction, the court
has jurisdiction to actually correct the sentence.
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Ultimately, Villavicencio's argument is that Rule 35 affords the court sufficient
jurisdiction to provide him with his preferred remedy, but insufficient jurisdiction to even
consider the state's requested remedy. Because Rule 35(a) gives the court authority to
correct an illegal sentence, it gives the court jurisdiction to actually correct the sentence.
The district court has jurisdiction to correct Villavicencio's illegal sentence and must
exercise its authority to correct that sentence in a way that implements the parties'
binding Rule 11 plea agreement.
Villavicencio's sentence was illegal. The parties do not dispute that the district
court structured Villavicencio's sentence in an unlawful way. The parties also do not
appear to dispute that the agreed-to provision, that Villavicencio be placed on probation
for a period of ten years, could have been imposed lawfully. The only question before
the Court is, what is the appropriate remedy to correct the illegal sentence? Because
Rule 11 obligates the district court to "implement the disposition provided for in the plea
agreement," the court must correct Villavicencio's sentence in a manner consistent with
the agreement. The proper remedy under Rule 35 is to correct the sentence, not to
negate the plea agreement.
Because the district court's order violates Rule 11 and vitiates the parties' binding
plea agreement, it should be reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's amended
judgment and remand this case for resentencing consistent with the parties' binding
Rule 11 plea agreement.

DATED this 31st day of March, 2015.

C:u~
Deputy Attorney General
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